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Religious fundamentalism may be 
described as “any claim to exclusive 
authenticity within a religious tradition.”1 
Scholars in this ﬁ eld concur that religious 
fundamentalists believe that they are the 
chosen people and therefore are privileged 
or burdened with a special mission on 
behalf of their deity.2 Moreover, unswerving 
belief in historical and doctrinal precedent 
moves them to stand apart from wider 
society. In this sense many link a ‘golden 
past’ with a utopian future when group 
strength will return. Seeking to achieve 
this, fundamentalists adhere to a speci-
ﬁ able orthodoxy, drawn from holy texts 
– Bible, Quran, Torah – whose words are 
interpreted literally by members and to 
which obedience is mandatory. This leaves 
no room for uncertainty or compromise. 
‘You are either with us or against us’ is a 
common attitude and those who differ 
are identiﬁ ed as oppressors, who should 
be resisted. Whenever conﬂ icts include 
religious components, fundamentalists are 
often by some means or other involved.  
Religious Fundamentalists 
as Saviors of Society: 
Perceptions, Goals, and Actions 
Depending on the nature, depth, and locale 
of the conﬂ ict, fundamentalist core opera-
tions may range from peaceful protests to 
attacks on public or private institutions 
and individuals to guerrilla warfare. The 
religious fundamentalist groups analyzed 
below have each undertaken one or more of 
these activities. By incorporating the role of 
the savior of society they are able to justify 
any action, however extreme, as well as any 
personal sacriﬁ ce no matter how great. 
The aforementioned attitudes, perspec-
tives, and especially the violent behavior 
of hardliner Arab and Israeli religious 
fundamentalists indicate that they are 
particularly ‘negative’ to the goals of 
the Middle East Conference (MEC). 
This being said, a word of caution is 
appropriate. Not all religious fundamen-
talists share the characteristics described 
above. Thus, it is important to distin-
guish between fundamental ists that 
are less inﬂ uenced by ideology than by 
circumstances. Contrary to ‘essentialist’ 
approaches, which focus mostly on the 
religious character of fundamentalists 
or even on religious texts as their bases, 
we assume that it is more appropriate to 
analyze the broader political context and 
the way it can shape the behavior of funda-
mentalists within the Middle East conﬂ ict. 
Instead of analyzing the religious core of 
these groups we will therefore focus on 
their ability to adapt to changing circum-
stances in a pragmatic way. We will show 
that, in fact, the positions and attitudes of 
fundamentalist groups can change with 
evolving political circumstances. 
Moreover, fundamentalists are by no 
means the only ones opposed to the 
peace process in the Middle East. Those 
who espouse liberal and/or secular-
conservative views may also reject it. 
Fundamentalists are thereby not neces-
sarily the greatest challenge to the success 
of the MEC. Indeed, they are a modest but 
highly vocal part of the conﬂ ict scenario. 
However, many individuals do support 
their positions and can be mobilized by 
religious fundamentalist groups to reject 
any compromise.
Religious Fundamentalism as 
an Obstacle to Peace in the Middle East 
Under What Conditions Might Pragmatism Prevail?
Judith Palmer Harik, Karima El Ouazghari (Coordinators)
Lars Berger, John Calvert, Akiva Eldar, Henrik Meyer, Mark Tessler, and Sami Zubaida
Abstract
Religious fundamentalists have in several 
instances served as barriers to the peaceful 
conclusion of disputes in the Middle East, 
especially in the framework of the peace 
process in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict. As a 
consequence and irrespective of the speciﬁ c 
deﬁ nition of fundamentalism, these groups can 
constitute in various countries a substantial 
hurdle for any arms control initiative such as 
the upcoming Middle East Conference (MEC). 
This gathering, planned for late 2012, is to deal 
with the establishment of a zone free of all 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and their delivery vehicles (DVs). Achieving a 
successful and sustainable outcome at the 
MEC could be hampered by a host of problems, 
one of which is the difﬁ cult role that religious 
fundamentalism could possibly play in under-
mining this initiative. Hence, this POLICY BRIEF 
provides decision makers and practitioners 
with information on these presumably ‘negative’ 
actors, drawn from case studies covering 
various fundamentalist groups within the 
Middle East and beyond. These recommenda-
tions are based on the key ﬁ nding that, contrary 
to mainstream expectations, the major players 
can behave pragmatically, provided they are 
acting in favorable circumstances. n
This POLICY BRIEF builds on the contributions 
of a number of additional participants from 
the ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST 
workshop held in Barcelona, Spain, from 
January 24–26, 2012. The Working Group on 
Religious Fundamentalism in the Middle East and 
this POLICY BRIEF have been generously funded 
by the Protestant Church of Hesse and Nassau.
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religious orientations. The known corre-
lates of these orientations may be used to 
project the future trends in militancy and 
attitudes towards the West. 
Structure and Outline 
of this POLICY BRIEF
Drawing insights from the evolution 
and operations of these actors, this 
POLICY BRIEF investigates which attitudes 
fundamentalist groups are likely to hold 
in view of the Middle East Conference. 
The guiding questions are as follows:
What are the ideology, constituency, • 
and goals of the respective fundamen-
talist group?
How inﬂ uential are these groups • 
within their society as well as abroad 
and how has this changed over time?
Do they act as spoilers to the Middle • 
East peace process and are they 
likely to do so for the Middle East 
Conference?
The selected fundamentalist groups 
are Israeli settlers, Palestine’s Hamas, 
Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian 
Islamic Action Front, the government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
American Christian Zionists. These 
actors were chosen because they all 
use their inf luence to directly affect 
the outcomes of issues involved in the
Middle East conﬂ ict. All of these are 
analyzed also with regard to the strate-
gies, tactics, and activities chosen to 
Some Survey Findings about 
Religion and Militancy 
among Muslim Arabs  
The results of the most recent Arab 
Barometer analyzed, amongst other things, 
the degree to which particular religious 
orientations help to shape individuals’ 
views about the U.S. and the West by 
measuring personal religiosity, the level of 
liberalism-conservatism in Islamic inter-
pretation, and attitudes towards political 
Islam.3 An analysis of the degree to which 
each of these three religious orienta-
tions inﬂ uences attitudes on militancy 
found that greater personal religiosity 
is not associated with greater militancy 
or stronger negative attitudes towards 
the West. By contrast, both, greater 
conservatism in Islamic interpretation 
and greater support for political Islam, are 
associated with greater militancy. Although 
multivariate analysis was employed and each 
relationship is statistically independent of 
the others, the ﬁ ndings only suggest but 
do not prove that the relationships involve 
causal connections. The accompanying
bivariate table (see above) illustrates the 
character of these relationships.
The general patterns may not apply in each 
country. However, the Arab Barometer 
data suggests that religion and religiosity 
do not predispose Muslim Arabs towards 
greater militancy but that more speciﬁ c 
orientations associated with Islam do 
increase the likelihood of holding more 
negative and militant attitudes towards 
the U.S. and the West. Future surveys 
will measure continuity and change in 
Religion and Militancy among Muslim Arabs
Percent agreeing 
that U.S. interfe-
rence in the region 
justiﬁ es armed 
operations
Percent disagreeing 
that despite negative 
U.S. foreign policy 




Less Religious 59 41
More Religious 57 45
Support for 
Political Islam
Less Supportive 52 26
More Supportive 61 47
Interpretation of 
Islamic Codes
Less Conservative 49 22
More Conservative 60 46
The corresponding ﬁ gures can be found under: http://www.arabbarometer.org/.
»Religion and religiosity do 
not predispose Muslim Arabs 
towards greater militancy.«
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advance their goals. Several propositions 
are drawn from the cases presented, 
regarding the potential capacity of the 
respective fundamentalist groups to adopt 
pragmatic and accommodative positions 
towards negotiation when their interests 
are involved. Recommendations are lastly 
made for actions to aid the modiﬁ cation 
of the rigid positions of these actors and 
to encourage compromise solutions. 
A View of Jewish 
Fundamentalism: The 
Secular-Liberal Alliance
Generally, the term ‘Israeli-Palestinian 
conﬂ ict’ is associated with the territorial 
issues of the West Bank, Gaza, and East 
Jerusalem, rather than with Israel’s right 
to exist. As a result, Jewish-Israeli funda-
mentalism has been preoccupied with the 
settlements built on lands Israel occupied 
in the 1967 War, their inhabitants, and 
their political and religious claims. The 
claim to the entire ‘Holy Land’ due 
to rel igious, historical, and emotional 
attachment has been attributed only to 
orthodox Jews (and Christian Zionists). 
Yet, secular Israeli leaders frame their 
political discourse using religious funda-
mentalist rhetoric. 
Israel’s Split Personality?
By any deﬁ nition of Jewish orthodoxy, 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a 
secular Israeli and a leader of a political 
party that is committed to democratic 
values and procedures, including the 
separation between state and religion. Yet, 
his speech at the UN General Assembly 
in late September 2011 exhibited typical 
fundamentalist rhetoric such as allusions to 
the Jewish people’s history of continuous 
presence on the land. The implication was 
that it should never be ceded to others. 
This indicates that in Israel, ironically, 
the leading secular ofﬁ cials support and 
even admire the settlers. The speech was 
actually applauded by mainstream politi-
cians and increased the Prime Minister’s 
approval rating. More dramatically, there 
was no public indignation over this speech 
by average secular, pragmatic Israelis.  
Fundamentalist Groups:  
Alliances, Actions, and Support 
The ideological settlers’ movement, Gush 
Emunim, emerged from the ashes of the 
1973 Yom Kippur War. The Likud Party 
developed four years after the war also 
as a result of public repulsion against the 
Labor Party’s corruption. The strategic 
blunder that allowed this was attributed to 
the secular escapist attitude of the Israeli 
Labor left-wing governments. The national 
Zionist camp knew how and when to make 
the best out of the national crisis. They 
offered the confused and bitter Israelis a 
new challenge – an attractive alternative 
to the desire to normalize life in Israel. 
In addition to the alliance with the 
secular right-wing Zionists, the ‘classical’ 
fundamentalist (Zionist orthodox right-
wing) community has consolidated close 
relations with two other constituencies: 
the non- and even anti-Zionist ultra-
orthodox community, and the secular, 
non-ideological settlers. Both of these 
groups moved to the occupied territories 
in order to improve their quality of life. 
Many of them adopted a right-wing 
ideological position in order to justify 
their move. 
The common ground for these groups is 
their interest in staying in their homes, 
expanding their communities, and keeping 
the special federal and municipal beneﬁ ts 
that all Israeli governments (except 
Yitzhak Rabin’s) have been offering 
them. In order to sustain these interests, 
the settlers have to make sure that the 
Palestinian occupied territories will never 
turn into a Palestinian State.   
Palestinians as Allies? Militancy Aids 
Jewish Fundamentalist Outreach
The suicide/martyrdom attacks on 
Israel i civ i l ians were started by the 
Islamic Jihad after the PLO had signed 
the Oslo Agreements. Hamas followed 
as a result of the 1994 massacre by a 
Jewish settler in Hebron, while Fatah 
militants did so after the l iquidation 
of their colleague, Read Karmi, by the 
Israeli army in January 2002. Moreover, 
the series of rocket attacks from Gaza 
after the Israeli withdrawal in 2005 also 
played into the hands of the settlers’ 
coalit ion. The reconcil iation discourse 
gave way to a national, basically funda-
mentalist discourse. Since then, the 
settlers have enhanced their penetration 
of the polit ical, mil itary, and judicial 
establishments, as well as the media. 
Having gained power, in pursuit of their 
national and religious values, they began 
to amend laws, which were in the way of 
turning Israel into a more ‘Jewish’ state 
»In Israel, ironically, the lead-
ing secular ofﬁ cials support and 
even admire the settlers.«
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failing uprising, it was decided to partici-
pate under a different name. In late 1987, 
Hamas was founded and presented itself 
to the Palestinian public by leaﬂ ets and 
the charter as the “Palestinian Branch of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.”5 
Over the following years, Hamas became 
a synonym for armed violence in the 
eyes of many, ﬁ rst and foremost through 
suicide/martyrdom bombings. Of course, 
those who supported Hamas considered 
such attacks a legitimate means of 
confronting a superior power. Especially 
during the second Intifada (from 2000 
until 2005), these tactics enabled Hamas 
to both obstruct the peace process and 
gain popular support as the only resistance 
movement perceived to be effective.
The growing support for Hamas was one 
of the factors that led to a signiﬁ cant 
change within the movement. In the 
run-up to the parliamentary elections in 
2006 and after intense internal debates, 
the Hamas leadership decided to partici-
pate in the elections for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. With Gaza having 
been its stronghold already, Hamas used 
the Israeli unilateral disengagement, in 
the summer of 2005, as ultimate proof that 
their ‘rejection’ policy was more effective 
than the PLO negotiations approach. As 
a result, Hamas later on won the elections 
in a landslide victory. The political ramiﬁ -
cations, however, go well beyond the gain 
in political support: By taking part in the 
elections Hamas effectively recognized a 
system it claimed to ﬁ ght.
The electoral program of Hamas’ ‘List 
for Reform and Change’ mostly refrained 
from religious references and focused on 
political challenges inside the Palestinian 
society. Israel only played a marginal role 
in this document. According to leading 
Hamas representatives, the 2005 platform 
remains their valid political program until 
today.
The huge differences to the uncompro-
mising charter led observers to different 
conclusions. Many – including Israel, 
the U.S., and the EU – referred to the 
continued ﬁ ring of self-made rockets from 
Gaza to point out that a change of Hamas 
was mere camouﬂ age. Others came to the 
conclusion that Hamas had taken the path 
of many other resistance movements and 
had undergone the transformation from 
an armed resistance group to a political 
party.
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(according to their interpretation) and a 
less democratic one.    
As long as they are not faced with local 
and/or external pressure, there seems to 
be very little potential to contain Jewish 
fundamentalists besides a regime change. 
Yet, polls demonstrate that the majority of 
the Israelis are content with the current 
government. The only hope might be that 
a second-term Obama administration 
will place the conﬂ ict at the top of its 
agenda. 
Hamas: Tamed?
Among the potential fundamentalist 
spoilers for progress in Middle Eastern 
peace, Hamas is probably at the same time 
the most infamous and the most sedated 
actor. After decades of suicide/martyrdom 
attacks, continued rocket ﬁ re on Israeli 
territory, and uncompromising rhetoric, 
militant action on the ground has been 
very limited over the past seven years. 
While many fail to recognize this devel-
opment, it might be taken as a prime 
example for the ability and willingness of 
fundamentalist religious groups to cope 
with changing political environments and 
requirements.
The origins of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement Hamas are located outside of 
the Palestinian Territories. They can be 
traced back to the founding of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. With 
Jerusalem being a holy site for Muslims, 
the movement led by Hassan Al-Banna 
dedicated time and energy to the British 
mandated territory of Palestine early on.4 
As in Egypt itself, the Muslim Brotherhood 
managed after 1948 to establish a system 
of education and social welfare through 
a dense network of mosques, schools, 
and hospitals. The declared goal was to 
change Palestinian society by establishing 
an ‘Islamic system.’
While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
maintained this strategy and mostly 
refrained from armed struggle, the 
Palestinian branch developed in a different 
direction. When in 1987 the ﬁ rst Intifada 
started, the leadership of the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood convened to discuss 
how to deal with the new situation. In 
order not to miss out on a unique oppor-
tunity to gain public support, it was agreed 
to participate in the struggle. At the same 
time, in order not to damage what had 
been built over years by a potentially 
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Both observations are, to a certain extent, 
true. This tightrope walk remains the main 
characteristic of Hamas and has become 
even more relevant since the organization 
seized power in the Gaza Strip in the 
tumultuous events of summer 2007. Ever 
since, Hamas has had to cope with a self-
inﬂ icted threefold identity: as a political 
party, it had won democratic elections. 
As an armed movement that still receives 
a considerable share of its funding from 
Iran, it had taken over power. As an 
administrative entity, it had taken over 
responsibility for more than 1.5 million 
people living in Gaza under harsh condi-
tions. This complexity shapes the political 
alignment of Hamas until today.
The political focus of the organization 
after 2007 has been on two areas: consoli-
dation and recognition. On the one hand, 
Hamas tries to establish a functioning 
administration in Gaza. On the other 
hand, representatives of Hamas struggle 
to get the world to recognize Hamas as a 
‘normal’ political party which can – and 
must – be part of any future political 
settlement. Efforts to religiously reform 
Palestinian society and to ﬁ ght Israel 
have become secondary at best. On the 
contrary: Hamas ofﬁ cials do not cease 
to repeat the ofﬁ cial position of the 
movement. Mantra-like, it is proclaimed 
that the ‘minimal demand’ of Hamas 
is the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state within the borders of 
1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, 
together with a ‘just solution’ for the 
Palestinian refugees.  With these demands 
being fulﬁ lled, Hamas would, according 
to Khaled Meshal, head of the organiza-
tion’s political bureau, sign a long-term 
truce with Israel. This position – which 
effectively accepts the two-state solution 
– has been upheld for several years now, 
despite huge internal pressure and the 
Gaza War of 2008/2009.
With the power gain of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas’ situation 
is today more comfortable than a few 
years ago. This actor is unlikely to 
give up the option of armed resistance 
without substantial concessions in return. 
Keeping in mind that the movement 
remains one of the most important spoilers 
for any Middle Eastern peace effort, the 
willingness of Israel and its allies to grant 
some concessions would thus present a 
huge opportunity not only to advance the 
stagnating peace process, but also to limit 
Iran’s role in the equation.
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Religious Fundamentalism 
with Nationalist Goals: 
The Case of Hezbollah 
Among the motivations that inspire 
rel igious fundamentalists’ beliefs and 
drive their actions, the category of 
‘nationalist’ f its the case of Hezbollah 
(the Party of God), the powerful Shiite 
political actor with a growing arsenal of 
sophisticated missiles. This group, while 
pursuing an essentially secular political 
mission (for instance the elimination 
of foreign occupation from national 
territory), however frames its mission as 
an obligation required by the dictates of 
religious orthodoxy.
Origins of Hezbollah and Its Goals
Hezbollah emerged in the early 1980s 
as a result of Shiite clerics and lay 
people who considered Jihad, in the 
military sense, against Israeli occu-
pation of a strip of southern Lebanese 
territory, a mission of political and reli-
gious obligation. As a result of Iran’s 
desire to export the Islamic Revolution, 
the Lebanese actors were provided 
with mil itary training, organizat ion, 
and material. Syria, an al ly of Iran, 
welcomed a force which would replace 
Palest in ian f ighters who had been 
evacuated after the Israeli invasion 
of 1982 and would insure that weapons 
coming from Iran reached Hezbollah. 
It would be up to Hezbollah to cement 
the local political support necessary to 
safeguard the ﬁ ghting-wing from domestic 
and foreign efforts to erase it. 
Religious Fundamentalism and 
Its Role in Mobilizing Shiite 
Support for the Resistance  
Hezbollah’s constituency is basically Shiite 
and its religious leaders and local ofﬁ cials 
have mobilized support by creating an 
Islamic environment in the areas politi-
cally dominated by the organization. 
Religious commemorations, celebrations 
of Hezbol lah mil itary act ivit ies, the 
establishment of seminaries (Hausas) and 
mosques are some of the avenues through 
which this is facilitated. A network of 
charitable Islamic institutions, provision 
of extensive social and public services as 
well as the promotion of Islamic values 
and practices through its television 
channel Al-Manar (The Beacon) are also 
very important.6
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Thus, a resumption of land-for-peace 
talks is the most promising means of 
sidelining Hezbollah and should be 
encouraged by those who are interested 
in such an outcome.  
The Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood: Pragmatic 
Fundamentalists in Search 
of Political Legitimacy 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
(EMB), founded in 1928 by Hassan 
Al-Banna, appeals primarily to Egypt’s 
pious middle class. The EMB advocates 
a leading role for Islam in government. 
Although the organization has a strong 
pan-Islamic orientation, its efforts are 
focused on Egypt. 
Goals and Methods
Throughout its history, the EMB has 
evolved in relation to circumstances. 
At first, it was a missionary movement 
dedicated to reforming society along 
Islamic lines. However, by the 1940s, 
it had adopted an increasingly political 
posit ion, emulat ing other pol it ical 
movements in forming a paramilitary 
wing. During the 1950s and 1960s, a number 
of its afﬁ liates responded to suppression 
at the hands of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
secular regime by adopting a confronta-
tional stance. The EMB ideologue Sayyid 
Qutb called for the creation of a vanguard 
movement to overthrow the regime and 
establish an Islamic state. 
Accommodation to Authoritarianism
However, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the Brotherhood explicitly repudiated the 
revolutionary aspects of Qutb’s ideology 
and revived its reformist mission. The 
EMB’s task was stated to be preaching 
God’s message, not to judge or to 
confront the political authority. However, 
the leadership allowed an exception to 
this rule in cases where Muslims endured 
occupation, as in Palestine. As a result, 
the organization supported the armed 
resistance of Hamas, its organizational 
spin-off in Gaza. 
Following this track, the Brotherhood 
generally complied with the restrictive 
laws imposed by the Mubarak presidency. 
In return, the regime tolerated a moderate 
level of political activity. However, the 
government curtailed the EMB whenever 
it gained too much ground. Towards the 
The charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah 
further plays a key role in mobilizing 
recruits and securing donat ions by 
references to Israel is as ‘usurpers of 
Muslim lands’ and his reminders of the 
blessings of martyrdom.
Efforts to Rally the Broader Lebanese 
Society Behind the Resistance
Through the above st rateg ies and 
its military feats against the Israelis, 
Hezbollah has gathered the political 
support necessary to win elections. In 
so doing, it has become a mainstream 
political party, promoting its struggle as 
a Lebanese national resistance as well as 
an Islamic resistance against Israel. The 
support of other Lebanese sects, political 
parties, and regional and international 
groups was thereby gained.  
On the other hand, Hezbollah’s military 
resistance activities, costly Israeli retali-
ations, and its monopoly of force have 
been highly resented by Lebanese ofﬁ cials 
and many citizens, particularly those 
of Christian and Sunni faith. Efforts to 
disarm Hezbollah by its local and foreign 
opponents therefore continue.  
Fighting the Enemy
Hezbollah’s mil itary performance in 
July 2006 showed that it had become 
an Arab army capable of wield ing 
advanced weaponry and blending 
classical guerrilla tactics with those of 
conventional warfare. The consequences 
were a ﬂ ood of donations to Hezbollah 
from enthusiastic regional and interna-
tional supporters and rapid action by 
Iran and Syria to replenish Hezbollah’s 
armory. Of especial relevance is the 
charge to have supplied Grad missiles.7 
A Hezbollah-inf luenced government is 
now in power.
Convincing the Party of God to 
Forego its Resistance Mission  
Hezbol lah leaders’ v iru lent pol it ica l 
d iscourse against the Israel i and 
American enemy renders any suggestion 
that it would willingly lay down its arms 
a moot point. Yet, if a land-for-peace deal 
between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria were 
concluded, arms shipments to Hezbollah 
would eventually halt, curtail ing or 
seriously weakening its resistance agenda. 
Pragmatic leaders would then presumably 
turn their attention to internal politics. 
»A resumption of land-for-
peace talks is the most 
promising means of sidelining 
Hezbollah and should be 
encouraged by those who 
are interested in such an 
outcome.«
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end of Mubarak’s rule, repression was 
particularly harsh, prompting the EMB 
to partially withdraw from the political 
scene. 
The Brotherhood Responds 
to Egypt’s 2011 Revolution
When the uprising against the Mubarak 
regime broke out in January 2011, the 
EMB was caught off guard. But once 
it was committed to the protests, its 
role was crucial. Spurred by its youth 
leaders, the EMB added its weight to 
the initially overwhelmingly secular 
opposition movement. Very quickly it 
formed a separate political wing, the 
Freedom and Justice Party, which won 
a parliamentary majority and then the 
office of presidency in Egypt’s January 
and June 2012 elections. While the EMB 
continues its charitable and religious 
work, the political party is adapting itself 
to Egypt’s political transformation. Its 
immediate challenge will be to alter the 
constellations of power on the ground in 
its favor. Important aspects in this will 
be its positioning towards or against the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 
which still wields parts of the executive 
authority.  
Political Pragmatism Tops 
Fundamentalist Ideology 
Since its foundation, the EMB has 
been guided by realism and open to the 
possibility of change within the 
framework of its ideology. A case in point 
is its position on the Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace Treaty. The EMB strongly supports 
the Palestinian cause. However, now that 
it dominates Egypt’s politics, it must act 
pragmatically in order to maintain this 
position. While it criticizes Israeli policy, 
it understands that Egypt’s military and 
most of the population would balk at 
the possibility of costly conf lict, not to 
mention the United States, an important 
supporter of the treaty, whose goodwill 
the Brotherhood cannot afford to 
alienate. In light of these circumstances, 
the EMB leadership is likely to uphold 
the treaty, even while individual members 
condemn it.
Political Legitimacy as a Major Goal
Given the EMB’s political ascendancy 
through democratic elections, Egyptian 
and international agencies have little 
choice except to recognize it as a legitimate 
component of Egypt’s political scene. 
Although an Islamist government is 
worrisome to many, the Muslim Brothers 
are rational political actors engaged with 
and inﬂ uenced by the Egyptian society and 
the wider international community. We 
expect the fundamentalist but pragmatic 
EMB to play the political game in ways 
gauged to maximize its own position 
of inf luence in a balancing act between 
inter-institutional power political tactics 
on the one hand and popular domestic 
as well international legitimacy on the 
other.
While this process might turn out not to 
be an entirely smooth one domestically, it 
is unlikely, from today’s perspective, that 
the Brotherhood’s position concerning 
the Middle East Conference will shift 
signiﬁ cantly towards a predominance of 
the ideological orientation. 
Jordan’s Islamic Action 
Front: A Loyal Opposition? 
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood 
( JMB) as well as its political arm, the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF), have always 
had a symbiotic and somehow special 
relationship with the House of the 
Jordanian King. When political parties 
were banned in 1957, the JMB remained 
legal on the grounds that it was not a party. 
The Islamist movement acted largely as 
a movement of ‘loyal opposition’ doing 
little, if anything, to actually threaten the 
status quo of Hashemite hegemony. As a 
reward, the King has granted the Islamist 
movement a greater degree of freedom 
to organize as well as autonomy in their 
social and political activities than similar 
movements received in most other Arab 
states. The favorable treatment under the 
Hashemites and the violent repression 
of its counterparts in Egypt and Syria 
formed a historical memory, which had 
a general moderating effect on the JMB’s 
political orientation.8
Official Stance: Rejecting the 
Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty
The IAF is predominantly a pragmatic 
organization, whose positions are f lexible 
and sensitive to different circumstances 
and vulnerable to political dynamics. 
This is clearly true for most issues in the 
field of domestic politics (e.g. alliances 
with non-Islamists, participation in 
autocratic governments) and economics. 
Nonetheless, it is less clear in the ﬁ eld of 
»It is unlikely, from 
today’s perspective, that 
the Brotherhood’s position 
concerning the Middle East 
Conference will shift signiﬁ -
cantly towards a predomi-
nance of the ideological 
orientation.«
8ACADEMIC PEACE ORCHESTRA MIDDLE EAST – POLICY BRIEF NO. 11 • SEPTEMBER 2012
foreign policy, shown by their adamant 
and continuing opposition to the peace 
treaty with Israel.9
In all ofﬁ cial party platforms (1989, 1993, 
2003, 2007) the existence of Israel and 
any moves to make peace with it have 
been rejected based on the belief that 
the land of Palestine is an Islamic trust. 
Therefore, the JMB and the IAF have 
criticized and denounced all meetings, 
negotiations, and agreements, especially 
the so-called Wadi Araba Treaty between 
Jordan and Israel.10 Together with the 
professional associations, the IAF leads 
the strong ‘anti-normalization’ movement, 
which consistently opposes any opening 
to Israel under current conditions: “We 
call the project of creating normal peace 
the project of surrender.”11 The most 
recent IAF party platform reinforced this 
position indicating that: “We believe that 
the Palestinian land from the sea to the 
river belongs to the Arab and Islamic 
nation completely.”12 It should be stated 
here, that the Wadi Araba Treaty is also 
rejected by large segments of the Jordanian 
population.
Diversity within the Movement: 
Pragmatism versus Ideology
Talking to different leading members 
of the IAF reveals a much more diverse 
picture of positions regarding the Middle 
East conﬂ ict. While some members 
emphasize the religious component of 
the party’s relation to Israel, others tend 
to very explicitly stress the political 
component of the Middle East conﬂ ict 
and rarely use religious arguments.
Contrary to the Egyptian Musl im 
Brotherhood, it is unlikely that the IAF 
will gain comparable political inﬂ uence 
through the Jordanian parl iament or 
government in the foreseeable future. 
However, similar to the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, the JMB and its political 
arm, the IAF, have been inﬂ uenced 
not only by its ideology but also by the 
political circumstances, to which it has at 
times reacted in a pragmatic way. Given 
its current limited inﬂ uence in regional 
politics and the fact that the IAF is not 
a key political actor in the Middle East 
conﬂ ict, its positions vis-à-vis the conﬂ ict 
are especially responsive to the broader 
political context. Therefore, the IAF is 
not likely to act as a spoiler to the Middle 
East peace process if there is some serious 
progress in the negotiations. 
The Case of Iran: Regional 
rather than Religious Actor 
Iran, as a state actor in the region, cannot 
be considered simply from the angle of 
religious fundamentalism, but, crucially, 
in terms of geopolitics and ideology. 
There are, of course, many different kinds 
of ‘fundamentalists’ in Iran, not always 
agreeing on matters of religion, law, and 
society. However, the question of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict is not part of 
their contentions, as they probably agree 
on antipathy to Israel and sympathy with 
the Palestinians. Yet, considerable sectors 
of the population, possibly a majority, are 
indifferent to religion: many studies and 
observations ﬁ nd Iranians to be much 
less pious than their Arab or Turkish 
neighbors. Apathy or opposition towards 
the regime may even react against the 
constant anti-American and anti-Israeli 
mantra of regime propaganda. The young, 
urban population, in particular, seems to 
identify with the cultural icons of America 
and the West. 
Iran’s Shiite Identity
Iran’s Shiite identity is a crucial factor 
in its regional strategy. At one level, 
the ideology of the Islamic Republic 
is pan-Islamist, proclaiming unity of 
Muslims and anti-imperialism. It is this 
element which is at the basis of its earlier 
attempt to export the revolution to the 
rest of the region. Iran’s pan-Islamism 
conf licts with its Shiite identity, an 
integral element of Iranian culture and 
nationalism. This sectarian factor was 
sharpened in the episode of war with Iraq, 
where a seemingly ‘secular’ Iraqi regime 
was underpinned by Sunni identity, and 
overwhelmingly supported by the ‘funda-
mentalist’ Sunni power of Saudi Arabia 
and much of the Arab world. 
The vociferous Shiite populations of 
some of these countries and their possible 
sympathy with Iran, were, and continue to 
be, seen as a threat and constituted a further 
reinforcement of the sectarian deﬁ nitions 
of regional politics. The championing of 
the Arab and Islamic cause against Israel 
then became a central plank in Iran’s drive 
for power and legitimacy in a predomi-
nantly Sunni Arab and Islamic world. The 
war slogans postulated Karbala and Iraq 
as stages on the way to Jerusalem. This 
taunted the Sunni Arab regimes with their 
failures in the face of Israel, especially 
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after the peace treaties with Egypt and 
Jordan, as well as the postulated subser-
vience of these countries, Saudi Arabia, 
and the Gulf to American policy, which 
fostered and protected Israel. 
Iran in a Changing 
Regional Environment
The alliance with Syria brought Tehran 
into direct contact with its allies in 
Lebanon and to the border with Israel, 
where Hezbollah ﬁ ghters have been active 
over the past thirty years. Hezbollah faces 
similar problems to those of Iran with 
regard to its Shiite identity. Sentiment 
with respect to Hezbollah and its Iranian 
patron has ebbed and ﬂ owed in relation 
to issues and events. What was seen as its 
successful resistance to Israel’s 2006 attack, 
was the height of Hezbollah’s and Iran’s 
appeal in the region, while Hezbollah’s 
armed assertion against the Lebanese 
government in 2008 heightened sectarian 
antipathies against it.
Regional developments in the last two 
years have posed challenges to Iran’s 
power and credibility. One was the 
regional policy transformation of the AKP 
( Justice and  Development Party) regime 
in Turkey, which turned on attempts at 
closer friendly relations with its Arab 
neighbors and a break with previously 
close relations to Israel. Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a much 
more popular and sympathetic ﬁ gure for 
Arab audiences and regimes than Iran’s 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and 
he is a Sunni. Iran’s credibility is further 
challenged by its Syrian alliance. Since 
Iranian propaganda has sought to present 
the Arab Spring as Islamist revolts similar 
to the Iranian revolution, and rejected any 
parallels with its own Green Movement, 
when Syrian internal hostilities ﬂ ared 
up, the revolt had to be presented as 
American/Israeli conspiracy against a 
steadfast national power. 
Hezbollah is similarly embarrassed, while 
Hamas seems to be disengaging from 
Syrian and Iranian patronage. Iran’s 
opportunities in the Arab world are 
now oriented towards Iraq and its Shiite 
dominated regime, though it must be 
pointed out that Iraqi Shiites are highly 
diverse and fractious in their politics 
and attitudes to Iran. The increasingly 
sectarian ﬂ avor of the geopolitics of 
the Middle East and the Gulf as well as 
the rise of Turkey as a regional power 
pose serious challenges to Iran. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict recedes in 
comparison, but the rhetoric remains 
intense. It is therefore highly unlikely that 
Iranian positions on Israel/Palestine and 
the question of peace negotiations would 
alter in the foreseeable future – especially 
the threat of a possible American/Israeli 
strike against its nuclear facilities even 
fosters anti-Israeli and anti-Western senti-
ments in the governing elite. However, 
regime change is always possible as has 
been seen in the recent Arab revolts.
Christian Zionism in the 
United States: Strengths 
and Limitations 
The Christian Zionists’ focus on the 
Jewish settlement of the ‘Holy Land’ 
predates the modern Jewish Zionist 
vision as it emerged in the 19th century. 
For Christian Zionists, the return of the 
Jewish people to the ‘promised land’ is 
an indispensible step towards the second 
coming of Christ. They generally play 
down the fact that this expected event 
would go along with the destruction of 
the Jewish people. This aspect is clearly of 
concern to those aware of the long history 
of Christian anti-Semitism. At the same 
time, Christian Zionists are closely aware 
of the Jewish people’s biblical depiction as 
God’s chosen people.
Christian Zionism and the 
U.S. Political System
This religious group differs from other 
forms of religious fundamentalism insofar 
as its inﬂ uence is most strongly felt with 
respect to the policies of the region’s 
(still) most important external power, 
the United States, rather than those of 
regional actors. The main addressees 
of such lobbying are, ﬁ rst, the adminis-
tration including the president and various 
departments tasked with executing speciﬁ c 
aspects of the American foreign, defense, 
and national security strategies. 
George W. Bush was the ﬁ rst U.S. President 
who embraced the Christian Right not 
merely out of political calculus – as did 
Republican Presidents Richard Nixon and 
Ronald Reagan. Yet, while he was widely 
perceived as the ﬁ rst genuine supporter 
of Christian Zionist thinking, he diverged 
from their more hard-line views on the 
Middle East on two important aspects. 
Bush followed President Bill Clinton’s 
emphasis on the peacefulness and 
»Iran cannot be considered 
simply from the angle of 
religious fundamentalism, but, 
crucially, in terms of geo-
politics and ideology.«
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contribution to civilization by Islam and 
Muslims, thus opposing the Christian 
Zionist dogma which focuses on a 
construction of Islam as inferior or 
even threatening. His endorsement of a 
Palestinian state also set, at least in theory, 
clear geographical limits to Jewish settle-
ment activities in the West Bank and Gaza.
In addition to directly pressuring the 
White House, the Christian Zionist 
lobby also addresses the U.S. Congress to 
stimulate pressure to help tilt White House 
policies. One such example has been the 
increasing outspokenness of conservative 
members of Congress to challenge U.S. 
policies that are not deemed to be sufﬁ -
ciently ‘pro-Israel.’ In fact, recent studies 
of Congressional voting on U.S. policies 
towards the Arab-Israeli conﬂ ict showed 
that Christ ian fundamental ism can 
increasingly be identiﬁ ed as a statistically 
signiﬁ cant factor in shaping individual 
lawmakers’ voting decisions on these 
issues.13
Christian Zionism in U.S. 
Public Opinion
Christian Zionist viewpoints also inﬂ u-
ence American public opinion. Surveys 
provide evidence of a partisan split 
that ref lects the increasing importance 
of this rel igious group’s views among 
Republican voters while Democrats are 
more inclined to favor even-handedness 
regarding the conf lict between Israelis 
and Palestinians. Also, Democrats are more 
inclined to favor diplomatic means or 
sanctions over military means to deal 
with emerging national security threats 
such as the one posed by Iran’s nuclear 
program.14  Statistical analysis of general 
U.S. public opinion has further shown 
that militant support of Israel is robustly 
correlated with cognitive dogmatism and 
the treatment of the Bible as infallible.15
Other studies have found Christ ian 
fundamentalism to correlate with the 
inclination to see Islam as a religion of 
violence.16
Christian Zionists’ Limited Role
It needs to be highlighted however, 
that despite Christian Zionist advances, 
developments in Israel and the broader 
region carry more importance in driving 
U.S. policy than the movement’s possible 
inf luence. If, either through electoral 
changes or polit ical calculations, the 
Israeli government decides it to be in its 
best national security interest to enter into 
substantial and meaningful negotiations 
with the Palestinians and other regional 
actors, it is difﬁ cult to envision a scenario 
where Christian Zionists will be willing or, 
if indeed so, strong enough to undermine 
a U.S. policy that supports the expressed 
wishes of the Israeli government. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
Regarding the ﬁ rst guiding question of 
ideology, constituency, and goals of the 
respective fundamentalist group, the case 
studies reveal that religious fundamen-
talists are not predeﬁ ned by their religion. 
Political leaders are after all, largely 
rational actors, following political calcu-
lations and adopting strategic behavior to 
achieve goals. The political circumstances 
they encounter are a crucial determinant 
of their positions and behavior. Thus, 
their religious doctrines were found to be 
quite ﬂ exible rather than stereotypically 
rigid. 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has, 
so far, shown a pragmatic attitude with 
regard to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty. While supporting the Palestinian 
cause and criticizing Israeli policy, it 
understands that Egypt’s military and 
most of the population would balk at the 
possibility of costly conﬂ ict. 
However, other fundamentalist groups 
behave in opposite ways. In this manner, 
Israeli settlers in the Westbank regard 
it as their duty to make sure that the 
Palestinian occupied territories will never 
turn into a Palestinian state. Notably, 
these groups are, however, also guided by 
rational interests and could be contained 
by local and/or external pressure. 
Their lack of will to compromise stems 
especially from the fact that they have the 
full support of the Israeli government. 
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has 
been rejecting the existence of Israel and 
the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty. At the 
same time, it is not a key political actor in 
the Middle East conﬂ ict and it remains 
unclear, whether these views would still 
hold true if the Brotherhood were to 
be part of the Jordanian government. 
Although not always agreeing on matters 
of religion, law, and society, the question of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict is not contr 
versial among the many different kinds 
of fundamentalists in Iran, agreeing on 
»Contrary to the beliefs 
of ‘essentialists,’ pragmatic 
accommodation is possible in 
principle. This is owed to the 
fact that fundamentalist actors 
are – despite their rhetoric 
and strongly held religious 
beliefs – also and sometimes 
even primarily, interested in 
gaining or retaining power.«
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antipathy to Israel and sympathy with 
Palestinians. As a result, it is highly 
unlikely that Iranian positions on these 
matters would alter in the foreseeable 
future. The same can be said of Iran’s 
Lebanese ally, Hezbollah.
The second guiding question of this 
POLICY BRIEF was concerned with the 
inﬂ uence of fundamentalist groups within 
the Middle East and abroad. The results 
are ambiguous. In Israel, since the 2005 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip the Jewish 
settlers enhanced their penetration of the 
political, military, and judicial establish-
ments, as well as the media. Contrary to 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it 
is very unlikely that the Islamic Action 
Front in Jordan will gain comparable 
political inﬂ uence through the parliament 
or other branches of government in the 
foreseeable future. 
Christian Zionists in the United States 
can increasingly be identiﬁ ed as a statis-
t ically signif icant factor in shaping 
individual lawmaker’s voting in Congress. 
However, this does not apply to presi-
dential policy: George W. Bush endorsed 
a Palestinian state and set, at least in 
theory, clear geographical limits to Jewish 
settlement activities in the West Bank 
and Gaza. In any case, it is difﬁ cult to 
think of circumstances where Christian 
Zionists would be wil l ing or strong 
enough to undermine expressed wishes 
of the Israeli government. However, in 
sum, religious fundamentalists are not 
likely to be marginalized as long as public 
opinion and state leaders remain resistant 
to change.
The third guiding question of this POLICY 
BRIEF has been whether religious funda-
mentalists act as spoilers to the Middle 
East peace process and whether they 
are likely to do so for the Middle East 
Conference. Although the results are 
mixed, the answers mostly negate this 
thesis. 
With regard to Hezbollah, framing its 
mission as an obligation required by 
the dictates of religious orthodoxy, the 
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Ministry of Foreign A airs
Party of God promotes its struggle as 
a Lebanese national resistance as well 
as an Islamic resistance against Israel. 
Without a land-for-peace deal between 
Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, Hezbollah is 
highly likely to remain acting as a spoiler 
in regional affairs. Similarly, without the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and 
a solution to the refugee question, Hamas 
will probably continue to behave in an 
obstructive way. 
The situation for the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Freedom and 
Justice Party is a new and difﬁ cult one, 
having acceded to power and having to 
balance domestic, regional, and interna-
tional demands. Iran which is challenged 
by the increasingly sectarian f lavor of 
regional politics and the rise of Turkey 
as a regional power, nevertheless keeps 
up its harsh rhetoric especially towards 
Israel and the United States. Even 
more so, it is l ikely that Tehran will 
continue using its proxies to challenge 
Israel. To complete the regional tour 
d’horizon, we have identified Israeli 
settler groups in the occupied territories 
as a major problem to the peace process. 
Nonetheless, with local and/or external 
pressure it might be possible to contain 
these groups and reduce their inf luence 
on Israeli politics.
Fundamentalist Pragmatism: 
The Key to Accommodation
We have identiﬁ ed fundamentalist 
leaders, after all, as largely rational actors, 
following political calculations and 
adopting strategic behavior to achieve 
goals. Gradualism is the name of the 
political game for (almost) all of the 
fundamentalist actors. 
Contrary to the beliefs of ‘essentialists,’ 
pragmatic accommodation is possible in 
principle. This is owed to the fact that 
fundamentalist actors are – despite their 
rhetoric and strongly held religious beliefs 
– also and sometimes even primarily, 
interested in gaining or retaining power. 
Thus, if the right circumstances for 
negotiation can be produced, intractable 
beliefs and attitudes could gradually be 
replaced by an ‘interest ﬁ rst’ approach 
that could move the hostile parties towards 
meaningful dialogue. n
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